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ABSTRACT 
We present a survey of credential management approaches for 
science gateways to integrate with the X.509 security 
infrastructure used by XSEDE.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When accessing XSEDE resources, science gateways can use a 
variety of credential management approaches for authentication, 
accounting, authorization, and auditing [8]. In this short article, 
we discuss the pros and cons of different approaches and we 
highlight remaining challenges. 
One of the key choices for the science gateway is whether to 
access XSEDE resources using individual user credentials, 
community credentials, or a combination of the two. Community 
credentials scale access to XSEDE resources by allowing the 
science gateway to locally manage users without requiring users 
to obtain XSEDE accounts. For users with XSEDE accounts, 
however, using their individual credentials via the science 
gateway can provide a greater level of access to XSEDE resources 
and avoid requiring a separate account at the science gateway. 
Credential lifetime is another important issue for science 
gateways. Short-lived credentials limit exposure to compromise 
but introduce challenges of issuance, expiration, and renewal, 
while long-lived credentials can significantly simplify credential 
management. While the science gateway could manage its own 
long-lived community credential, security policy requires 
individual credentials to be only short-lived at the gateway. 
In the next section, we discuss pros and cons of current 
approaches for managing credentials in XSEDE science gateways, 
including considerations of security risks, complexity, and 
usability. Then in the following section we conclude by discussing 
remaining challenges and open issues. 
2. APPROACHES 
Community Credentials: In the community credential approach 
[12], the science gateway uses its own credential for 
authentication to XSEDE services. This credential may be a 
community user certificate or robot certificate or host/service 
certificate. Pros: 1) Widely supported by X.509 software, 
including Globus and UNICORE. 2) Certificates may be long-
lived to avoid expiration/renewal concerns. Cons: 1) Long-lived 
credentials increase exposure to compromise. 2) Makes per-user 
accounting more difficult. 
Per-User Attributes: A science gateway using a community 
credential may generate a proxy certificate containing per-user 
attributes for accounting purposes. This approach has seen limited 
adoption in XSEDE to-date [6]. Pros: 1) Enables per-user 
accounting by XSEDE resources. Cons: 1) Requires a complex 
software stack. 2) Not supported by UNICORE and other grid 
middleware. 
MyProxy: In the traditional MyProxy approach [2], the user 
enters a username and password at the science gateway, which the 
science gateway uses to obtain a short-lived certificate for that 
user from a MyProxy server. Pros: 1) Multiple MyProxy client 
implementations are available. 2) Widely used and supported by 
projects and services. 3) The MyProxy server can be configured to 
support certificate renewal [1]. Cons: 1) Since it exposes the 
user’s MyProxy password to the science gateway, XSEDE’s 
MyProxy server no longer supports this approach. 2) The 
MyProxy protocol is not SOAP or REST, so it can be difficult to 
integrate with web services. 
MyProxy Session Passwords: One method to address password 
exposure is to create per-session passwords by storing short-lived 
credentials in the MyProxy repository for each application [9]. A 
current application for this technique is activation of Globus 
Transfer endpoints, because the Globus Transfer API requires a 
MyProxy password. Pros: 1) Avoids exposure of long-lived 
passwords. 2) Works with applications that require MyProxy. 
Cons: 1) Requires a MyProxy repository server. 
OAuth for MyProxy: In this approach, the science gateway 
redirects the user’s browser to a MyProxy OAuth service where 
the user logs in and delegates a certificate back to the science 
gateway [3]. Pros: 1) Supported by XSEDE. 2) Protects the user’s 
MyProxy password from exposure. Cons: 1) No credential 
renewal support. 2) No API support (i.e., browser-based). 3) Uses 
older OAuth 1.0 protocol. 
MyProxy Gateway: When using the MyProxy Gateway (MPG) 
[7], the science gateway redirects the user's browser to the MPG 
service where the user logs in and grants permission for the 
science gateway to obtain a delegated credential. The gateway can 
then obtain a credential on behalf of the user as needed. Pros: 1) 
Full OAuth 2.0 support including credential refreshing and 
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multiple protocol flows (web, mobile, and device). 2) Supports 
per-user attribute injection via the MPG server, eliminating the 
need for complex attribute injection in the science gateway. 3) 
Protects the user's MyProxy password from exposure. Cons: 1) 
Not currently supported by XSEDE. 
CILogon: CILogon [5] is an instance of OAuth for MyProxy that 
supports campus authentication via the InCommon federation. 
Pros: 1) Enables users to log in with their campus credentials. 2) 
Does not expose the user’s password to the science gateway. 
Cons: 2) No credential renewal support. 2) No API support (i.e., 
browser-based). 
Airavata Credential Store: The Apache Airavata Credential 
Store provides credential management that is closely integrated 
with the Airavata science gateway middleware [10]. Pros: 1) 
Supports credentials of different types (X.509 certificates, SSH 
keys). 2) Supports multi-tenant science gateway hosting via a 
shared middleware tier. 2) Provides credential expiry notifications 
and supports MyProxy certificate renewal. Cons: 1) Depends on 
the Airavata middleware. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
A challenge that science gateways face is a continuously changing 
landscape: new software is released and support for old software 
is lost, new services are provided and old services are retired, 
security algorithms and policies change, etc. For example, 
currently multiple XSEDE science gateways must update their 
software to support the SHA-2 hash algorithm used in X.509 
certificates, replacing the older SHA-1 hash algorithm which is 
now considered too weak. Supporting SHA-2 means replacing old 
software (such as JGlobus 1.0) that science gateways depend 
upon. Integrating with RESTful services, such as the MyProxy 
Gateway, can be an attractive alternative to introducing new 
software dependencies directly in the science gateway. 
Credential management (the focus of this short article) is only one 
aspect of science gateway security. Science gateways must 
address a variety of operational security challenges including least 
privilege access, data integrity and isolation, software patching, 
intrusion detection, and incident response [4][11]. Leveraging 
existing security services, on campus and in the cloud, where 
possible, can significantly reduce risk and complexity for the 
science gateway developer and operator. 
In conclusion, a variety of software and services are available to 
assist science gateways with managing credentials for accessing 
XSEDE resources. Multiple interfaces to MyProxy enable 
integration with campus credentials, multi-tenant gateway 
architectures, and RESTful APIs.  
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